Is there a word left out there, or not? Is there a "that" between "object" and "is," or not? Because otherwise I can't actually parse this sentence, though perhaps it would make more sense in-context.
No but that's the best way to parse it out of context.
I think that that sentence would read better for me if it had commas. It looks like they are saying that particular "distanced look" model of theoria is the thing that intrinsically normalizing, but the clause in between made it hard for me to parse.
I've never heard of Irigaray. Thoughts on where to start reading? I've only read secondary sources here, sorry.
Ok.
Forgive me, but WTF does "a fundamental cut across all things" mean? Is it cut in the sense of mental dissection, getting deeper into the heart of the self through interrogating everything? How is one supposed to perform this cut?
The cut of the umbilical cord? The use of language as prosthesis for understanding the world? Umm... I really only sort of get this part. It's a psychoanalytic thing.
If they are really arguing against using language as a prosthesis in that way, or arguing that one should cut through the idea of language as a prosthesis for understanding the world. I find it ironic that they're doing so using language, but such is the way of the world.
Ok, so. But does it somehow...sully those Platonic ideals, sully the queering of the theory, when they're brought into the real world to be enacted, by men in drag or whomever? (If so, then does that make platonic ideals that cannot yet be enacted in the real world, like phantom wing syndrome, more queer as ideas than, say, gender theory?)
Deleuze and Colebrook don't think so --- it's not about sullying, it's just about the enactment in reality of those Ideals as being not the totality of those ideals. Enacting something doesn't sully it, it just isn't it? If that makes sense? However the idea of phantom wings being more queer than queer theory is fascinating.
Hm. I think that when I read Deleuze wants to go back to Plato's discussion of Ideas "beyond the lived experience of self" but rather than cover them up with subjectivity, create "a liberation of essence and distinction from the lived world."
I read that "covering up with subjectivity" as inherently a sullying, because if the goal is to create "a liberation of essence and distinction from the lived world," then bringing those ideas into the lived world to be enacted necessarily covers at least part of the idea with the subjectivity you are trying so hard to get away from. I suppose as long as you recognize that there is a part of the idea that you cannot necessarily enact in the lived world that the entire thing is not necessarily covered up with a subjective, lived experience, but the twin goals of "enacting in the real world" and "distinction from the real world" seem at odds with each other. And what about ideas where the totality of them can be enacted in the real world? I'm having trouble thinking of a great many ideas where parts of them are, by necessity, not enacted in a real space in a subjective way.
Also, holy shit. Are all these people you cited here just things you downed in your spare time while no one noticed?
Hardly. :) I mean the Barthes and the Sedgwick were spare time reading but everything else I mentioned was for some class or another, and I was introduced to Sedgwick by a class, I just read extra stuff I wasn't required to. I haven't actually read much Deleuze/Guattari at all --- this class is covering them in a five-hour mega-epic week 5, and so I have not tried to catch up on the theory that I am busy enough anyway and the professor put them in that order for a reason even though it doesn't make sense to me.
Hopefully by the time you get there you'll have figured out why they're in there that way.
no subject
No but that's the best way to parse it out of context.
I think that that sentence would read better for me if it had commas. It looks like they are saying that particular "distanced look" model of theoria is the thing that intrinsically normalizing, but the clause in between made it hard for me to parse.
I've never heard of Irigaray. Thoughts on where to start reading?
I've only read secondary sources here, sorry.
Ok.
Forgive me, but WTF does "a fundamental cut across all things" mean? Is it cut in the sense of mental dissection, getting deeper into the heart of the self through interrogating everything? How is one supposed to perform this cut?
The cut of the umbilical cord? The use of language as prosthesis for understanding the world? Umm... I really only sort of get this part. It's a psychoanalytic thing.
If they are really arguing against using language as a prosthesis in that way, or arguing that one should cut through the idea of language as a prosthesis for understanding the world. I find it ironic that they're doing so using language, but such is the way of the world.
Ok, so. But does it somehow...sully those Platonic ideals, sully the queering of the theory, when they're brought into the real world to be enacted, by men in drag or whomever? (If so, then does that make platonic ideals that cannot yet be enacted in the real world, like phantom wing syndrome, more queer as ideas than, say, gender theory?)
Deleuze and Colebrook don't think so --- it's not about sullying, it's just about the enactment in reality of those Ideals as being not the totality of those ideals. Enacting something doesn't sully it, it just isn't it? If that makes sense? However the idea of phantom wings being more queer than queer theory is fascinating.
Hm. I think that when I read Deleuze wants to go back to Plato's discussion of Ideas "beyond the lived experience of self" but rather than cover them up with subjectivity, create "a liberation of essence and distinction from the lived world."
I read that "covering up with subjectivity" as inherently a sullying, because if the goal is to create "a liberation of essence and distinction from the lived world," then bringing those ideas into the lived world to be enacted necessarily covers at least part of the idea with the subjectivity you are trying so hard to get away from. I suppose as long as you recognize that there is a part of the idea that you cannot necessarily enact in the lived world that the entire thing is not necessarily covered up with a subjective, lived experience, but the twin goals of "enacting in the real world" and "distinction from the real world" seem at odds with each other. And what about ideas where the totality of them can be enacted in the real world? I'm having trouble thinking of a great many ideas where parts of them are, by necessity, not enacted in a real space in a subjective way.
Also, holy shit. Are all these people you cited here just things you downed in your spare time while no one noticed?
Hardly. :) I mean the Barthes and the Sedgwick were spare time reading but everything else I mentioned was for some class or another, and I was introduced to Sedgwick by a class, I just read extra stuff I wasn't required to. I haven't actually read much Deleuze/Guattari at all --- this class is covering them in a five-hour mega-epic week 5, and so I have not tried to catch up on the theory that I am busy enough anyway and the professor put them in that order for a reason even though it doesn't make sense to me.
Hopefully by the time you get there you'll have figured out why they're in there that way.