Reading Notes: Heidegger, "The Thing"

[rax]

I took one of the Heidegger pieces to write detailed notes on because I wanted to push myself. Well, uh, I'm pu[ni]shed.

"All distances in time and space are shrinking." I've heard this idea before --- probably people taking after Heidegger, of course --- we can travel faster, we can reproduce the past at great speeds, there's television, which Heidegger says "will soon pervade and dominate the whole machinery of communication." (Did it?)

But this doesn't mean everything is necessarily near to us. "Short distance is not in itself nearness. Nor is great distance remoteness." So what is nearness then, he asks, and then "Is not this merging of everything into the distanceless more unearthly than everything bursting apart?" 

And now a brief interlude about the atomic bomb! "The atom bomb and its explosion are the mere final emission of what has long since taken place, has already happened." (I'm sort of skeptical about this at a physics level, but I can see how it's true metaphorically, that is, we've already made the bomb and so the use of the bomb is potentially inevitable? Actually, again --- I can't help but think about a literal atom bomb made of literal atoms --- I think that if you left an atom bomb for 100K years it would eventually become inert. Disarmament through extinction.)

We are unsettled and terrified because things can be not-distant and still not have nearness. So "What about nearness? How can we come to know its nature?" Well fancy that, that was the question I had too! "Nearness, it seems, cannot be encountered directly." Oh. "We succeed in reaching it rather by attending to what is near. Near to us are what we usually call things. But what is a thing?" [0] The jug is a thing! It is self-supporting, independent, and because of that it is not just an object. An object can become a thing, but the "thingly nature of the thing does not consist in its being a represented object." Yes, that's right. The thingly nature of the thing. Whaaaaa? Oh, "The jug remains a vessel whether we represent it in our minds or not." I interpret this (as I was so excited to do with Barad!) as saying that consensus reality is really there, matter is objectively matter, it's a jug and you can't unthink it out of being. I don't know if that's what Heidegger actually means though.

Also the jug was made! Out of earth! And that makes it actually a thing and not just an object --- "Or do we even now still take the jug as an object? Indeed." We don't know how to get from "the objectness of the object" to the "thingness of the thing." (Is there a difference between a thingness and a "thingly nature?") OK. So... "What is the thing in itself? We shall not reach the thing in itself until our thinking has first reached the thing as a thing."

"The jug is not a vessel because it was made; rather, the jug had to be made because it is this holding vessel." The physical "what stands forth" of the jug is just the object and not the thing. Plato (and "Aristotle and all subsequent thinkers") [1] didn't get the thing because he was too focused on this "eidos" or idea of the object. "The jug's thingness resides in its being qua vessel." The part of the jug that holds wine is actually the void between the sides and above the bottom; the potter "only shapes the clay. No--- he shapes the void." How apotheosiscore.

"And yet, is the jug really empty?" (This is actually the question I was just gonna ask.) No, it's full of air, we got tricked. (By... ourselves? By Heidegger? I feel like all of these questions and contradictions are either going to lead to something fascinating, or Heidegger thinks I am a four-year-old.) Wine actually displaces air, it replaces one filling with another filling. "But --- is this reality the jug? No." "Science makes the jug-thing into a non-entity in not permitting things to be the standard for what is real." I'm gonna have to take issue here. No. The jug is an entity. Like the air, and the wine, it is made of matter. You are trying to define air as void just because you, a human, pass through it with relative ease compared to other substrates. Your frame of reference is part of the apparatus making that agential cut, sir. Air is not void. Void is void. If we put you in a vacuum, you'd know the difference. I promise.

Science has annihilated things as things and the atom bomb is the "grossest" example of this. Science's sphere is "the sphere of objects." It is a "weirdness" that "science is [delusionally] superior to all other experience in reaching the real in its reality." I mean, there's something to be said for arguing for the limitations of science, OK, I just don't like his examples so far. So "what, then, is the thing as thing, that its essential nature has never yet been able to appear?"

We didn't lose sight of the jug because of science, Heidegger, we lost sight of the jug because you stopped talking about the jug. "We did not let the jug's void be its own void... We failed to give thought to what the jug holds and how it holds." I'm bothered by this, rhetorically, because we just did. We thought about what the jug holds (air, "void," wine) and how it holds it (by the self-supporting structure of the bottom and sides of the jug, over and between which the liquid is poured in order to place it into the jug). We just thought about that, because Heidegger told us to. Now we are being told that we did not think about it. What did we think about, then?

The jug "holds in a twofold manner" by taking and keeping what is poured in. This "rests on the outpouring" --- the potential for later pouring liquid out of the jug. "The jug's jug-character consists of the poured gift and the pouring out." Even an empty jug has this --- you can't not pour liquid out of a scythe like you can not pour liquid out of an empty jug.

"The giving of the outpouring can be a drink." OK. ... "It stays in the wine by the fruit of the vine, the fruit in which the earth's nourishment and the sky's sun are betrothed to one another." ... ... ... ... ... "The gift of the outpouring is what makes the jug a jug." OK, I liked this idea when we ran into it in one of the other readings, actually --- Sofia talks about this and makes it useful I think. "In the jugness of the jug, sky and earth dwell." ... Sometimes the jug's gift is not for drinking! Sometimes it is a consecration, it is for gods, it does not quench thirst. "In giving the consecrated libation, the pouring jug occurs as the giving gift." "Gush" is "to offer in sacrifice." 

"In the gift of the outpouring earth and sky, divinities and mortals dwell together all at once. These four, because of what they themselves are, belong together. Preceding everything that is present, they are enveloped into a single fourfold." Heidegger is wiser than all gods and scientists, for he has created four simultaneous worlds in four simultaneous days.

"The jug presences as a thing. The jug is the jug as a thing. But how does the thing presence? The thing things. Thinging gathers. Appropriating the fourfold, it gathers the fourfold's stay, its while, into something that stays for a while: into this thing, that thing." Does this make any more sense in German??

The Old German word "thing" means a gathering --- "specifically a gathering to deliberate on a matter under discussion, a contested matter." Like res, related to Greek eiro. "Dictionaries have little to report on what words, spoken thoughtfully, say... Etymology has the standing mandate first to give thought to the essential content involved in what dictionary words, as words, denote by implication." Page 175 claims that English "thing" still has "the full semantic power of the Roman word." Is this moving toward a distinction between the bearing-upon and the standing forth? A distinction between an object disconnected from others and a thing with bearing and meaning in a system? If that's where he's headed I could get behind that conclusion despite being intensely frustrated with his prose.

Kant's thing-in-itself is really just an object-in-itself. The only "semantic factor" we can really take from the other uses of the word "thing" is the sense of a gathering if we really want to get into the Heideggerian thingness of a thing. This apparently brings us back to nearness --- the jug, in being a thing which itself things, "stays earth and sky, divinities and mortals," gathering them, "nearing" them by "bringing-near." "Nearing is the presencing of nearness. Nearness brings near --- draws nigh to one another --- the far, and, indeed, as the far. Nearness preserves farness. Preserving farness, nearness presences nearness in nearing that farness. Bringing near in this way, nearness conceals its own self and remains, in its own way, nearest of all." [2] So... by bringing us [back, these days] in touch with the distance between us and things, we see how near they are, because we are [once again] close to their ineffable distance? I'm trying to unpack this. This closeness to distance is nearest of all?

"When we say earth, we are already thinking of the other three along with it by way of the simple oneness of the four." See, I already turned down Catholicism, but thanks anyway.

"Only man dies. The animal perishes. It has death neither ahead of itself nor behind it." Disagree! "She has no archives, no heirlooms, no future / except death," don't you go trying to take away my vixen body without organs Mr. Heidegger.

"Rational living beings must first become mortals." What would D&G say about this? They're who come to mind right now when I think about becomings. I would suspect that if anything, we couldn't become-mortal as they say we couldn't become-man [3], but we could become-immortal at a molecular level. I guess at face value I can accept this statement, especially if you accept the old saw that "man is the only animal who understands his own mortality." I'm not sure I do --- we have some evidence to the contrary --- but certainly our relationship to death is one of our driving forces in art and religion and philosophy and so on. Maybe the argument is that if you exist only in the "immaculate present" you are not mortal? Not sure I agree, but at least there's an argument there.

...which is sort of my way of saying I think the end of this turns into incoherent mush even more than the rest of it. I guess at the very end the question is what can be a thing, and the answer is that anything can be a thing, but "only what conjoins itself out of world becomes a thing." Most things are just objects.

...I still have to turn this into notes that will be helpful to the class and that the professor can read. That will be exciting. I may just give in and say "Hey I spent five or six hours on this, I do not get it, here is what I have." I'm a little skeptical that there is an it to get, but I should probably look for secondary texts or something. I may edit this post or comment to it if I find some.

ETA: Mostly the secondary texts I am finding are other people's blog posts which, rather than throwing their hands up in the air as I do, only talk about the first five pages of the text. I did find this, and it's priceless:

"Seemingly departing from his view that Heidegger ran out of steam in 1930, Harman thinks that Heidegger's analysis of the thinghood of the thing is perhaps his greatest achievement. Having described Heidegger's analysis in the Bremen lectures of the thinghood of a jug he writes: "Whereas Plato, Aristotle, and all later thinkers failed to notice the thinghood of things Heidegger tells us that this neglected thinghood has a fourfold structure. It is a fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals" (p. 131). There have so far, he thinks, been only a "handful of weak attempts" to understand the fourfold (das Geviert). Harman's own attempt to explain it is in terms of what he calls the "intersection of two distinct dualisms". Once we have identified these two dualisms the elements of the fourfold will "immediately become clear". The first dualism is that "between a thing's shadowy concealment and its explicit appearance" which "is also known as the temporal interplay between past and future, or between the equipment that silently functions and the signs and broken equipment that show themselves 'as' they are" (p. 133). The second dualism is that "between the unity of a thing's existence and the plurality of its essence or qualities" (p. 133). Harman then proceeds to explain the terms of the fourfold by assigning them to different sides of the two dualisms. For example, mortals, due to their capacity for death as death, are placed "on the side of clearing or revealing, due to the role of the explicit as-structure here" (p. 133) and are assigned to the unity side of the second dualism because they are engaged with death and "death or Angst reveals the world as a whole and not a plurality of specific things" (p. 133). Although some of Harman's explanations are genuinely helpful, this is not one of them.--Paul Gorner, University of Aberdeen."

If there have only been a handful of attempts to explain this and the attempts that have been made are basically crack as above, I feel less bad about going huhguhbuhwha.


[0] I know this is ridiculous, but I cannot help but read this essay and think of the hyper-machismo old spice commercials. "I am the philosopher your philosophy could read like. Look at me. Look at you. Look at me. I'm an atomic bomb. Look at my hand, now at yours. Now at mine. I am holding a jug. The jug is a thing. It has the thingly nature of that thing you like. I'm on a horse."

[1] The last person I know who made cracks at "all subsequent thinkers" is the Time Cube guy. Just sayin'.

[2] And the tweedle battle beetles had a tweedle beetle puddle paddle battle.

[3] I'm skeptical of this, but I haven't come up with a really good way to address it yet.

Comments

[chagrined]

So I just read this and I'm like ಠ_ಠ so much right now. HEIDEGGER WHY. I agree with you and those ppl whose posts you found about this in that in the beginning of this one, I was like, okay, not feeling like I got everything, but I got ~some~ things. And then by the end I was like WHAT THE FUCK IS GOING ON THINGS THING THINGILY THINGING THINGS.

If we put you in a vacuum, you'd know the difference. I promise.

CAN WE DO THIS I WANT TO DO THIS *GLARES AT HEIDEGGER*

Well obvsly the reason we didn't understand it is b/c we haven't read Sein und Zeit in the original German as an introduction to the LATE Heidegger. T__T

[1] - LOL 4EVER, I may have to quote this in a post XD

[2] - YAYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY

[lhexa]

Stanley Cavell text dump. From "The Uncanniness of the Ordinary":

"Wittgenstein says in the Investigations, "When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of the every day. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say? Then how is another to be constructed? -- And how strange that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we have!" (stanza 120). Strange, I expect Wittgenstein immediately to reply, that we can formulate so precise and sophisticated a charge within and against our language as to find it 'coarse' and 'material'. Are these terms of criticism themselves coarse and material?

Now listen to words from two texts of Heidegger's, from the essay "Das Ding" ("The Thing") and from his set of lectures Was Heist Denken? (translated as What is Called Thinking?), both published within three years before the publication of the Investigations in 1953. From "The Thing:" "Today everything present is equally near and far. The distanceless prevails." And again: "Is not this merging [or lumping] of everything [into uniform distanceless] more unearthly than everything bursting apart? Man stares at what the atom bomb could bring with it. He does not see that the atom bomb and its explosion are the mere final emission of what has long since taken place, has already happened." What has already happened according to Heidegger is the shrinking or disintegration of the human in the growing dominion of a particular brand of thinking, a growing violence in our demand to grasp or explain the world. (I put aside for the moment my distrust, almost contempt, at the tone of Heidegger's observation, its attitude of seeming to exempt itself from the common need to behave under a threat whose absoluteness makes it [appear to us] unlike any earlier.) A connection with ordinary language of the fate of violent thinking and of distancelessness comes out in What is Called Thinking?, where Heideggers says:

'A symptom, at first sight quite superficial, of the growing power of one-track thinking is the increase everywhere of designations consisting of abbreviations of words, or combinations of their initials. Presumably no one here has ever given serious thought to what has already come to pass when you, instead of University, simply say "Uni." "Uni" -- that is like "Kino" ["Movie"]. True, the moving picture theater continues to be different from the academy of the sciences. [Does this suggest that one day they will not be different? How would this matter? How to Heidegger?] Still, the designation "Uni" is not accidental, let alone harmless, [p. 34]'

Reading this I ask myself: When I use the word "movies" (instead of "motion pictures?" "cinema?") am I really exemplifying, even helping along, the annihilation of human speech, hence of the human? And then I think: Heidegger cannot hear the difference between the useful non-speak or moon-talk of acronyms (UNESCO, NATO, MIRV, AIDS) and the intimacy (call it nearness) of passing colloquialisms and cult abbreviations (Kino, flick, shrink, Poli Sci). But then I think: No, it must be just that the force of Heidegger's thought here is not manifest in his choice of examples any more than it is in his poor efforts to describe the present state of industrial society (as if our awareness of the surface of these matters is to be taken for granted, as either sophisticated or as irredeemably naive.) In descriptions of the present state of Western society, the passion and accuracy of, say, John Stuart Mill's prose quite eclipses Heidegger's. And as to his invoking of popular language and culture, Heidegger simply hasn't the touch for it, the ear for it. These matters are more deeply perceived in, say, a movie of Alfred Hitchcock's.

To dispel for myself Heidegger's condescension in this region I glance at a line from Hitchcock's North by Northwest (the one in which Cary Grant is attacked by a crop-dusting plane in a Midwestern cornfield and in which he rescues a woman from he Mount Rushmore monument of the heads of four American presidents.) The line is said by a man in response to Grant's asking him whether he is from the F.B.I.: "F.B.I., C.I.A., we're all in the same alphabet soup"; after which the conversation is drowned out by the roar of an airplane, toward which they are walking. At first glance, that line says that it doesn't matter what you say; but at second glance, or listening to the growl of the invisible motor, the line suggests that it matters that this does not matter. That line invokes (1) the name of a child's food, something to begin from; and (2) a colloquialism meaning that we are in a common peril; and (3) is a sentence whose six opening letters (initials) signal that we have forgotten, to our peril, the ABC's of communication, namely the ability to speak together out of common interest. But have we forgotten it because we lack long or ancient words? It seems more worthwhile to ask why "F.B.I." abbreviates a name that has in it the same word as Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, and to ask what the concept of intelligence is that the military have agencies and communities of it whereas universities do not. But if I am willing to excuse Heidegger provisionally for his lack of ear in such regions, then I must wait for my approach to them until later in this chapter when I invoke the writing of Ralph Waldo Emerson and of his disciple Henry David Thoreau, for both of whom the idea of nearness, or as Thoreau puts it, of nextness (by which he explicitly says that he means the nearest), is also decisive, and whose concepts I feel I can follow on."

A perhaps more helpful one, from "Texts of Recovery":

"The second of the sequence of four texts in which I propose to study the Kantian bargain with skepticism (buying back the knowledge of the world by giving up things in themselves) and romanticism's bargain with the Kantian (buying back the thing in itself by taking on animism) is Heidegger's "The Thing" ("Das Ding"), which I am taking as another effort, companion to Coleridge's [namely his Rime of the Ancient Mariner], at the overcoming of the line in thinking, Kant's line to begin with.

Heidegger's essay gets us to Kant's question almost without our knowing it, over a Heideggerian path of questions that makes the Kantian seem simply in its familiarity. Heidegger's opening sentence is, "All distances in time and space are shrinking"; then further down the first page, "Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance"; then on the next page, ""How can we come to know... the nature [of nearness]?... Near to us are what we usually call things. But what is a thing?"; and on the third page, "What in the thing is thingly? What is the thing in itself? We shall not reach the thing in itself until our thinking has first reached the thing as a thing." This turns out to require "a step back" from the way we think to another way ("looking another way" Thoreau calls perhaps this). And close to the end the essay has: "Thinking in this way, we are called by the thing as the thing. In the strict sense of the german word bedingt, we are the be-thinged, the conditioned ones. We have left behind us the presumption of all unconditionedness."

What the essay is after is a return of human thinking around from Kant's turning of it upside down in his proud Copernican Revolution for philosophy: rather than saying that in order for there to be a world of objects of knowledge for us, a thing must satisfy the conditions -- whatever they turn out under philosophical investigation to be -- of human knowledge, Heideggers is saying that in order for us to recognize ourselves as mortals, in participation with earth and sky, we must satisfy the conditions of there being things of the world -- whatever accordingly these turn out within philosophical thought to be. And this apparently means: The redemption of the things of the world is the redemption of human nature, and chiefly from its destructiveness of its own conditions of existence.

Is this a philosophy of romanticism? If it systematizes something like the task of romanticism in poetry, that is, if romanticism believes, and is right in its belief, that things need redemption from the way we human beings have come to think, and that this redemption can happen only poetically; then according to Heidegger's essay romanticism would be right in believing that is is thereby a redemption of human nature from the grip of itself. And in that case the activity of poetry is the possibility of human life; so it is understandable that poetry takes itself, its own possibility, as its proper subject.

This, by the way, sketches out a response to one of the earliest and latest charges against the romantics, to the effect that they prefer things to people. At a high level it is expressed in D'Alembert's rotten crack about Rousseau that he would not need so much to be by himself if he did not have something to hide. On a lower plane there is Irving Babbitt's Pastor Mandersish observation that "the hollowness of the Rousseauistic communion with nature" is one of romanticism's "substitutes for genuine communion" (Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 235).

Without lifting a finger now to lay out and to try to justify Heidegger's argument (roughly, that the recall of things is the recall, or calling on, of humanity), I point to the feature of it that poses to my mind, or let me say to the Enlightenment mind, the hardest barrier to this philosophical work, to our accepting this work as philosophy -- its coming out with such propositions as the following: 'The thing stays -- gathers and unites -- the fourfold. The thing things world.' That was published in 1950, when it would still have been fashionable for an analytical philosopher, had he (or just possibly, then, she) come across such propositions excerpted some place or other, to call them meaningless. More serious, or significant, for us now, I believe, is that we can see that such a term of criticism would have been offered with, or as, a kind of nervous laugh. I am confident enough that the older charge of meaninglessness, directed toward such propositions, has become quite quaint in its intellectual isolation; for not only can the meaning of those propositions readily be explained in the terms the essay, and its companions, set up; but the fact that apart from those terms -- say, in what might be called cognitive terms -- they would be meaningless is not only not a charge against the propositions, but the very heart of the teaching of which they are part. Those who teach them, or anyway say them, may be deluded; they may be frauds; but they are not speaking meaninglessly.

Yet I find that such propositions do project a barrier for me. It comes from my still not understanding the nervous laughter they still may at any time -- to the post-Enlightenment mind -- inspire. I interpret the nervousness as responding to another apparent exchange of knowledge for animism. But if Heidegger's idea of the thing as thing, gathering and uniting something or other, must be seen as expressive of animism, then what was presenting itself as a philosophy of romanticism merely begs, it does not clarify, the questionable idea that keeps surfacing in romantic texts, that there is a life and death of the world, dependent on what we make of it."

I haven't read "Das Ding", and am not particularly ashamed of the fact, so I can't help you further.

[talia_et_alia]

Yeah, I started making TimeCube references a couple of paragraphs after your [1], when he started in on the fourfold whatnot.

D asks whether anyone, preferably Foucault, has written a treatise on the use of numbers in philosophy.

[lhexa]

Also: I acquired Barthes' A Lover's Discourse and have read portions of it. I dislike it. It is not a book about love, but rather a book about infatuation. I could go on at much greater length, but if you would find such a criticism overly harsh, then I will skip such exposition.

[rax]

I would argue there are portions that are about infatuation, but I'm happy to hear critique of it --- I don't think it's perfect, just that it's been useful to me. I'm sorry it hasn't been useful to you!

Also thank you for sending that Cavell, some of it was directly useful and the rest of it at least made me feel better. ;)

[lhexa]

Eh, on second thought, I don't want to go to greater length. The one thing I did say can stand as a summary for most of what the longer critique would contain.

On the other hand, this situation did provide the opportunity to clarify why I have such strong reactions toward books, most books in fact. Emerson says in "Self-Reliance", "Who has more obedience than I masters me." This seems like just a bit of self-indulgent contradiction until you realize that the mastery he speaks of is not the mastery of a slave, child or wife, but the mastery of a text. The texts I master are the ones to which I show the most obedience: I become willing to follow their fancies and self-indulgences, accept their descriptions, and think in their terms, and one criterion for mastering a text would be to understand it (obey it) even more than the original author. So the fact that there are some writers, like Heidegger and Derrida, who leave me with a feeling of revulsion, indicates that were I to show them such obedience they would abuse it. (I do not claim they abuse all their readers.) Similarly, when I come across writers toward whom I feel disdainful (like Barthes or D&G), it indicates that I could offer them such submission, but they would not do anything worthwhile with it, they would neglect it. I do not claim that this is the only way or picture of reading, but it is one that explains the strength of my responses.

[rax]

I really, really, really like your metaphor, and I think it's entirely reasonable that different people would find what Barthes has to do with that obedience either useful or not. Thank you.

(I'm still not sure if D&G will do anything worthwhile with my submission, but my advisor got enough out of the process that I'm willing to give it a try. Even if I am mostly wasting time I will probably learn something.)

[lhexa]

Yay! Also, if there's no objection, I'll probably take a prior bit of this conversation to post to my journal.

[rax]

I have no objection. :)

[lhexa]

Going a little bit further: after accusing Derrida elsewhere on your journal of feigning mastery of a text, I started to wonder what counts as true mastery. Extending the idea above, I think that disobedience of a text is only possible from a standpoint of mastery, because you can't disobey what you aren't in a position to obey. So what I see at play in Derrida is not only a feigned mastery but a feigned disobedience, as though he only learned enough from Austin to make a point of spurning him.

If I had critiqued Barthes it would have ended up similarly. There are times when the full articulation of an aversive response counts as a good criticism, but this was not one of them.

[kiya]

Wow, it's like "Does a dog have the Buddha nature" only much, uh, thingier.

Metasyntactic variables for the jug.

[sovay]

"I am the philosopher your philosophy could read like. Look at me. Look at you. Look at me. I'm an atomic bomb. Look at my hand, now at yours. Now at mine. I am holding a jug. The jug is a thing. It has the thingly nature of that thing you like. I'm on a horse."

. . . I kind of want the T-shirt of that.

[lhexa.livejournal.com]

Ooh ooh ooh! My man Cavell not only does a decent job at explaining one thread of this essay, he has a (separate) takedown of its sense of condescension toward contemporary culture. Give me a little while to transcribe those two passages.

[weirdquark]

Ada says that I should tell you her Heidegger party trick, because it's awesome:

You take a non-fiction humanities text. Cover half of the page vertically and read the bits that you can see. Then read a page of Heidegger. They will sound the same. Then cover half of a page of Heidegger, also vertically, and read all of the bits that you can see. It will make more sense.

[gaudior.livejournal.com]

Your frame of reference is part of the apparatus making that agential cut, sir. Air is not void. Void is void. If we put you in a vacuum, you'd know the difference. I promise.

You are awesome, did you know?

Also, I enjoy my position of continuing to be around people who have read Heidegger and watching their heads explode entertainingly. Someday it will be my turn for the reading and the head-exploding, but for the moment, this is all good.

<3, --R

painter 11

[(Anonymous)]

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